by Jordan Warner Unusually for a Christian, I'd describe myself as a utilitarian, in the sense of wanting the greatest good for the greatest number. I interpret ”maximising utility” as consisting of working out how to do what's best for everyone, and then trying my best to do that. I acknowledge that my attempts to do this are inevitably constrained by my own selfishness and ignorance, but I find both my Christian faith and my participation in Effective Altruism to be helpful at addressing those shortcomings. While I can imagine being convinced to follow an alternative moral philosophy, you'd have to convince me that following that alternative philosophy would result in a better outcome - I'd basically just be a consequentialist with extra steps!
The meaninglessness of suffering is a central point in the post, but proponents of suffering-focused morality proceed from an opposite position: that suffering is inherently negatively meaningful. Then, because of the asymmetry between states of extreme suffering and happiness, prevention of extreme suffering takes priority in ethics. This is view (iv) in Alvin's post, and I think this is the view many suffering-focused EAs subscribe to. It would be interesting to see discussion on what makes something meaningful and to what extent suffering needs or needs not to be taken into account based on meaningfulness.
I think there are a few different types of things people sometimes mean by suffering focused ethics (or consequentialism):
(i) that only negatively valanced mental states count
(ii) that both negatively and positively valanced mental states count, but reducing the quantity of negative states takes absolute priority over increasing the quantity of positive states
(iii) that both negatively and positively valanced mental states count, but in our decision making we ought to give greater weight (by at least some degree) to reducing a unit of negative states over adding an equivalent unit of positive states.
(iv) that we ought to give similar weight to reducing a unit of negative states and adding an equivalent unit of positive states similarly. However we still ought to focus most of our attention on reducing negative states, as there is much more extreme suffering in the world than extreme bliss, and there are some very tractable ways of reducing lots of the extreme suffering.
Whilst I don't personally find (i), (ii) or (iii) that plausible, I do think (iv) is a very plausible view. I didn't really understand why acknowledging that "suffering seems to be an inevitable part of life" or that "focusing on my own suffering would have been very counterproductive" provide arguments against a view like (iv) - or in reality also against (i)-(iii) either. Keen to understand your view a bit better (and sorry if I misunderstood your argument).
The meaninglessness of suffering is a central point in the post, but proponents of suffering-focused morality proceed from an opposite position: that suffering is inherently negatively meaningful. Then, because of the asymmetry between states of extreme suffering and happiness, prevention of extreme suffering takes priority in ethics. This is view (iv) in Alvin's post, and I think this is the view many suffering-focused EAs subscribe to. It would be interesting to see discussion on what makes something meaningful and to what extent suffering needs or needs not to be taken into account based on meaningfulness.
I think there are a few different types of things people sometimes mean by suffering focused ethics (or consequentialism):
(i) that only negatively valanced mental states count
(ii) that both negatively and positively valanced mental states count, but reducing the quantity of negative states takes absolute priority over increasing the quantity of positive states
(iii) that both negatively and positively valanced mental states count, but in our decision making we ought to give greater weight (by at least some degree) to reducing a unit of negative states over adding an equivalent unit of positive states.
(iv) that we ought to give similar weight to reducing a unit of negative states and adding an equivalent unit of positive states similarly. However we still ought to focus most of our attention on reducing negative states, as there is much more extreme suffering in the world than extreme bliss, and there are some very tractable ways of reducing lots of the extreme suffering.
Whilst I don't personally find (i), (ii) or (iii) that plausible, I do think (iv) is a very plausible view. I didn't really understand why acknowledging that "suffering seems to be an inevitable part of life" or that "focusing on my own suffering would have been very counterproductive" provide arguments against a view like (iv) - or in reality also against (i)-(iii) either. Keen to understand your view a bit better (and sorry if I misunderstood your argument).